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COMMENTS
DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A TEMPORAL CROSS-
SECTIONAL APPROACH
INTRODUCTION
It has often been argued that the imposition of
capital punishment serves three general purposes:
retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation. The last
goal dictates against the use of the death penalty,
and the first is often criticized as archaic and
barbaric. By a process of elimination, deterrence is
left as the principal theory lending support to and
serving as a rationale for this most extreme form of
punishment. For this reason, "deterrence has re-
ceived an increasing amount of attention from
scholars in a variety of fields."'
Particular attention has been focused on the
utility of the application of capital punishment as
an effective deterrent force. Various statistical
methodologies have been employed in attempts to
measure and test the extent of the effects that the
risk of death has on potential and actual murderers.
To date, the empirical findings have been generally
inconclusive.
2
There are several reasons why such studies have
been criticized for only marginally contributing to
the debate over the efficacy of capital punishment
as a means of deterring homicides. First, the data
being used for the statistical tests are not generally
considered to be random samples approximating
the true population values. 3 Second, the question
of which variables should be used is still open. One
approach may examine capital punishment as a
deterrent force by itself, while another methodol-
ogy may phrase the issue in terms of which punish-
I F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERENCE 2-3 (1973).
2 Most of the studies are discussed in this study; for
example, see Ehrlich, The Deterrent of Capital Punishment: A
Question of Life and De4th, 65 AM. EcoN. REV. 397 (1975);
Forst, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment A Cross State
Analysis of the 1960's, 61 MINN. L. REv. 743 (1977); Passell,
The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty: A Statistical Test, 28
STAN. L. REv. 61, 66 (1975); Sellin, Experiments with
Abolition, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENTS 122 (1967) (hereinafter
cited as Sellin Experiments); Sellin, Homicides in Retention-
ist and Abolitionists States, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENTS 135
(1967) (hereinafter cited as Sellin Homicides).
3 See Note, Crime Statistics-Can They Be Trusted, 1 AM.
CriM. L. REv. 1045 (1973), for a general discussion of the
available data and the shortcomings of these sources.
ment, death or life imprisonment, is the superior
deterrent for policy purposes. Third, even if the
death penalty is assumed to be an effective deter-
rent force, it would be difficult to prove since
murders which are actually deterred will not be
reflected in the crime statistics. In effect, crime
data reflect those murders for which the threat of
the punishment of death either did not represent
a deterrent force to prevent the crime or was not
considered at all.
The actualuse of capital punishment itself as an
acceptable form of societal penalty does not rest on
solid grounds either. It is important to recognize
that even if it is assumed that the potential fear of
death can deter a crime, this in itself may not be a
necessary and sufficient reason for use of the death
penalty.4 The execution of a convicted offender is
not only the most severe form of punishment pos-
sible, but it is also permanent. Uncertainty reflect-
ing the balancing of the high cost of imposing the
death penalty against the as yet unproven gains
resulting from the imposition of death in turn
produces two further uncertainties. First, the im-
position of the death penalty, if it truly has no
deterrent effect, results in the probability of a net
loss to society while achieving no goal other than
retribution. Second, even if a potential victim's life
is saved because of the deterrence impact, there
will be a net gain to society only if the life of an
offender is valued differently from that of a victim.
6
These questions are essentially moral and value
judgments which even the best empirical findings
cannot be expected to answer in any substantive
way.
Studies of deterrence and capital punishment
rest on a crucial assumption which may be unwar-
ranted: men are rational in their behavior. This
involves two related factors directly impinging
upon the proposition that potential murderers gen-
erally react the same to different types of situations
4 Tullock, Does Punishment Deter Crime?, 36 PUB. INTER-
ESr 103, 108 (1974).
5 Van den Haag, On Deterrence and the Death Penalty, 60
.J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 141, 146-47 (1969).
and stimuli-a rational thought process and
knowledge. First, if the crime is one of passion or
provocation as opposed to premeditation and de-
liberation, as many if not most murders are consid-
ered to be, then the threat of a particular punish-
ment or the difference between types of punish-
ment will be effectively nullified.6 In other words,
the relevant variable is actually only that part of
all homicides and non-negligent manslaughters
that is the result of deliberation, malice and afore-
thought. Thus, although there is evidence that the
threat of punishment does deter "burglary and
other property crimes, it is unlikely to have much
effect on crimes of impulse, such as rape and many
murders.",7 The only satisfactory solution to this
problem is data which reflect only murders result-
ing from rational thought processes and choices;
unfortunately no such data exist. The other prong
of the rational man theory involves the assumption
of knowledge on the part of the potential offender.
That is, even assuming a potential murderer is
calculating and deliberate in his actions,
[flor punishment to have a deterrent effect, poten-
tial criminals must have at least some information
about its likely severity and frequency. Presumably,
the effect of variations in punishment would be
greater if criminals were well-informed than if they
were not. In practice, of course, potential criminals
are not very well-informed about these things, but
they do have some information.
8
The issues, shortcomings, and questions raised
above must be recognized in order to evaluate
properly and objectively the results of empirical
situation. Solutions to many of these may well
involve an individual moral resolution of the values
6 As United States Supreme Court Justice Brennan,
concurring in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1971),
said:
It is not denied that many, and probably most,
capital crimes cannot be deterred by threat of pun-
ishment. Thus the argument can apply only to those
who think rationally about the commission of cap-
ital crimes. Particularly is that true when the poten-
tial criminal, under this argument, must not only
consider the risk of punishment, but also distinguish
between two possible punishments. The concern,
then, is with a particular type of potential criminal,
the rational person who will commit a capital crime
knowing that the punishment is long-term imprison-
ment, which may well be for the rest of his life, but
will not commit the crime knowing that the punish-
ment is death.
Id. at 301 (Brennan, J., concurring).
7 Tullock, supra note 4, at 108.
8 Id. at 109.
involved, a task not attempted in this study.
9 More-
over, the fact that the statistical and theoretical
underpinnings of such studies have been subjected
to such criticism does not mean there is little or no
information to be obtained from their findings. On
the contrary, even given these limitations, such
research has resulted in "modest increments in
understandings."' Any additional empirical evi-
dence, even if suggestive rather than definitive,"
contributes information which is invaluable in
trying to determine whether capital punishment
really represents a viable and effective means for
society to vindicate its values.
The focus of this comment will thus be two-fold:
first, to analyze those studies which have attempted
to verify empirically the existence of a deterrent
effect of capital punishment, and second, to present
the results of new empirical research which has
tried to take into account many of the criticisms
directed at the analyses to be discussed. The issues
highlighted above, as well as others to be raised
later, serve the useful function of placing these
statistical studies in their proper perspective by
indicating the problems raised by an empirical
approach. There is at the same time, however, a
realization that this type of research may yield
9 In this regard, one writer has doncluded that "we
have no right to risk additional future victims of murder
for the sake of sparing convicted murderers; on the
contrary, our moral obligation is to risk the possible
ineffectiveness of executions." Van den Haag, supra note
5, at 147.
ioZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 1, at 3.
tId.
12 In Rudolph v. Alabama, 275 Ala. 115, 152 So. 2d
662 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 889 (1963), Justice Gold-
berg, dissenting from denial of certiorari, observed:
The following questions, inter alia, seem relevant
and worthy of argument and consideration:
(1) In light of the trend both in this country and
throughout the world against punishing rape by
death, does the imposition of the death penalty by
those States which retain it for rape violate "evolv-
ing standards of decency that mark the progress of
[our] maturing society," or "standards of decency
more or less universally accepted?"
(2) Is the taking of human life to protect a value
other than human life consistent with the constitu-
tional proscription against "punishments which by
their excessive ... severity are greatly dispropor-
tioned to the offenses charged?"
(3) Can the permissible aims of punishment (e.g.,
deterrence, isolation, rehabilitation) be achieved as
effectively by punishing rape less severely than by
death (e.g., by life imprisonment); if so, does the
imposition of the death penalty for rape constitute
"unnecessary cruelty?"




information which may contribute to the goal of
satisfactorily resolving these issues.
ISAAC EHRLICH AND DETERRENCE
Until recently, very little had been done in the
way of statistically testing the deterrence hypothe-
sis in a rigorous manner. The studies that had
evaluated capital punishment as an effective means
of preventing murders tended to analyze the issues
on a non-empirical level, relying on sociological,
economic, demographic and psychological theories.
The studies that were statistically-oriented did not
involve sophisticated models, and the great major-
ity rejected the hypothesis that the threat of death
does affect the commission of homicides. In addi-
tion, Supreme Court decisions, principally Furman
v. Georgia1 3 and Gregg v. Georgia,4 not only served to
fuel the debate over capital punishment, but also
seemed to stimulate social scientists and econome-
tricians to redouble their efforts in attempting to
isolate and identify what, if any, deterrent effect
exists. The potential utility of such evidence was
underscored by the references made in the amicus
curiae brief of the Solicitor General of the United
States in Fowler v. North Carolina.15 The brief cited
as principal evidence of the positive deterrent effect
of capital punishment a 1975 study by Isaac Ehr-
lich.1
6
,Recognized as the principal proponent of the
value of capital punishment as a tool of deterrence,
Ehrlich has tested several sophisticated economet-
ric models, all purporting to demonstrate that the
deterrence hypothesis should be accepted. In re-
viewing the pro-deterrence literature, primary at-
tention will be paid to Ehrlich's research; his meth-
odological approach, findings, and conclusions will
be discussed, analyzed, and criticized.
Ehrlich's Research: Accepting the Deterrence Hypothesis
Ehrlich's original study was published in 1975
and quickly became a center of controversy. Using
13 408 U.S. 238 (1971). The Supreme Court, in a 5-4
decision, held that the imposition of the death penalty in
a murder case constituted cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments,
and concluded that the punishment of death does not
invariably violate the Constitution.
14 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The Supreme Court upheld the
sentence of death in an armed robbery and murder
conviction against the challenge of cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth
amendments and concluded that the punishment of
death does not invariably violate the Constitation.
"" 428 U.S. 904 (1976).
16 Ehrlich, note 2 supra.
an economic approach to murder, Ehrlich con-
structed a supply function of murders1 7 and used
it to test the basic hypothesis that as the use of
capital punishment increases, the rate of homicides
will decrease. Each murderer was hypothesized to
have a utility function which reflects the direct
costs of planning and executing the crime as well
as the risks of incurring detrimental losses if appre-
hended, convicted and/or executed. All other
things being equal, it was theorized a rational
offender will exhibit behavior designed to maxi-
mize his utility and will commit the crime only if
the expected utility is greater than the expected
utility of the second-best or second-choice action.
Given these basic behavioral assumptions, Ehr-
lich then isolated for statistical purposes three de-
terrence variables: the probability of being appre-
hended, the conditional probability of being con-
victed if apprehended, and the conditional proba-
bility of being executed given conviction. In terms
of actual effectiveness, Ehrlich ranked apprehen-
sion first and execution last on the basis of the
magnitude of the corresponding elasticity.18 As he
noted, "On the basis of this analysis, it can be
predicted that while the execution of guilty mur-
derers deter acts of murder, ceteris paribus, the ap-
prehension and conviction of guilty murderers is
likely to have an even larger deterrent effect."'19
In addition to these deterrence measures, Ehrlich
also included in his equation economic variables
for the United States, labor force participation rate
(the per cent of the population having or actively
seeking employment), the unemployment rate, per
capita permanent income, and age distribution.
The deterrence variables actually inserted in the
17 Ehrlich's function postulates that the supply of hom-
icides will be determined by the interaction of deterrence,
economic, and demographic/social variables. That is,
assuming all other factors remain constant, an increase
in the rate of execution (a conviction or apprehension)
will result in a decrease in the ratio of homicides. This
simple supply function is then combined with the nega-
tive social demand for murder and asserts as a basis for
the analysis that the offender will respond to certain
incentives included in the supply equation. Id.
8An elasticity basically measures the percentage
change in one variable brought about by the percentage
change in another or the responsiveness of the quantity
demanded of a variable to change in its price. If the
elasticity is greater than, less than, or equal to one, the
relationships (usually demand) is said to be relatively
elastic, inelastic, or unitary elastic, respectively. For ad-
ditional information, see JOHNSTON, ECONOMETRIC MEmH-
ODS (1972) or CHIANG, FUNDAMENTAL METHODS OF MATH-
EMATICAL ECONOMICS (1967).
19 Ehrlich, supra note 2, at 402.
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equation were constructed using proxies. The prob-
ability of being apprehended was measured by
clearance rates (estimates of all murders "cleared"
by the arrest of a suspect), the probability of con-
viction was the fraction of all persons charged with
murder over those who were convicted of it, and
the probability of execution had different measures
involving lagged and current values of executions
and convictions. The left-hand or dependent vari-
able is the homicide rate, represented by the num-
ber of non-negligent manslaughters and murders
per 100,000 persons.
The structural equation actually estimated is of
the Cobb-Douglas variety, meaning that the esti-
mated coefficients of the explanatory variables may
be interpreted as elasticities.2° To correct for inter-
dependencies among the murder rate and the prob-
abilities of conviction and execution, Ehrlich uti-
lized a regression technique known as two-stage
least squares, 21 which merely involves the insertion
of certain exogenous or instrumental variables into
the equation to solve this problem of simultaneity.
The equation is estimated for the United States for
the period 1933-1969 and consists of variables in
modified first-difference form (autoregressive trans-
20 A Cobb-Douglas production function takes the form
of the following (expressed in Ehrlich's terms):
QiN = C*P *P a*P }¢*UP'*LP"*Yg'*A# exp (vi)
where Q/N rate of non-negligent manslaughter and
murder
P. probability of apprehension
Pa,, probability of being convicted
P.,/ probability of being executed
L labor force participation rate
U unemployment rate
Yp permanent income per capita (Friedman
measure)
A per cent of population between ages of 14-
24
C constant term
vI disturbance term assumed to have first or-
der serial correlation
When the equation is estimated, the estimated coeffi-
cients are the exponent (a and /3) and may be interpreted
as elasticities. That is, a3 represents the responsiveness of
Q/N to a unit percentage change in Pl,. Id. at 406-07.
21 An increase in the execution rate will presumably
result in lower jury convictions for capital crimes, thus,
if rising executions cause a decrease in convictions, then
the perceived effects of executions on the homicide rate
might appear positive. Two-stage least squares allows the
effect of the two variables to be separated in a systematic
way.
formations of the original variables measured in
natural logarithms).22
Ehrlich found that the regression results indi-
cated that his hypothetical ranking of the effect of
the deterrence variables is correct and that the
signs of the estimated coefficients (elasticities) and
their magnitudes conform to general theoretical
expectations. 23 In defense of his techniques, Ehrlich
contended that his results are
robust with respect to the functional form of the
regression equation. In addition, estimating the
regression equations by introducing the levels of the
relevant variables rather than their modified first
differences (that is, assuming no serial correlation in
the error term) artificially reduces the standard
errors of the regression coefficients as would be
expected on purely statistical grounds.24
In terms of the implications for the trade-off be-
tween murders and executions, Ehrlich's results
suggest that every additional execution would save
the lives of seven or eight potential murder victims.
In evaluating his own findings, Ehrlich did not
claim to have proved the deterrence hypothesis
since he recognized the possibility of bias due to
the absence of data on the severity of alternative
punishments, although he did not know which way
this would bias his results. On the contrary, Ehrlich
claimed merely a tentative acceptance of the hy-
pothesis. As Ehrlich maintained, "[I]n view of the
new evidence presented here, one cannot reject the
hypothesis that law enforcement activities in gen-
eral and executions in particular do exert a deter-
rent effect on acts of murder. Strong inferences to
the contrary drawn from earlier investigation ap-
pear to have been premature.
' ' 5
In addition to this time series analysis, Erhlich
also tested in a separate study the deterrence hy-
pothesis using cross-sectional data.2 The focus was
on the cross-sectional patterns of murders and ex-
ecutions for the years 1940 and 1950. The principal
advantage to this analysis as compared to the first
study is the availability of data for variables not
• See Klein, Forst & Filatov, The Deterrent Effect of
Capital Punishment: An Assessment of the Estimates, in NA-
TIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DETERRENCE AND INCAPACI-
TATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
ON CRIME RATES, 336-52 (1978).
23 Ehrlich, supra note 2, at 411.
24 Id. at 412.
25Id. at 416.
26 Ehrlich, Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Some Further




available over time, such as estimates of the severity
of punishment (median time spent in prison prior
to first release or the actual length of the prison
sentence) for murder and other crimes.
This approach rests on key.structural relations:
first, the supply function for offenses, and second,
the demand for enforcement activities. The typical
deterrence variables were specified again as prices,
costs, or negative rewards. The explanatory vari-
ables were grouped into two categories-deterrence
and economic/demographic. The former consisted
of the probability of conviction measured by the
ratio of convictions per number of homicides, the
median time spent in prison prior to first release,
and the probability of execution measured by the
ratio of the average number of executions in the
last "x" number of years to the number of convic-
tions for murder in the current year. The demo-
graphic/economic variables included the per cent
of nonwhites in the population, the per cent of
families with incomes less than one-half of the
median family income for the state, the median
family income lagged one year, the per cent of the
population between ages fifteen and twenty-four,
and the per cent of the urban population to the
state population.
The estimation technique was ordinary least
squares;2 7 two-stage least squares could not be used
because of data exigencies. Supply functions were
estimated separately for executing states as well as
the full sample because the estimated levels of the
conditional risks of execution in abolitionist states
were effectively zero. Tests for homoscedasticity
(changing variance in the error term) proved neg-
ative, so generalized least squares estimators were
obtained by weighting all the variables by the
square roots of either the urban, state, or relevant
sample populations.
The regression results again indicated that the
three deterrence variables (apprehension, convic-
tion, and execution) are statistically significant and
negatively related to the rate of homicides. The
elasticity of the rate of homicides with respect to
2 Briefly, ordinary least squares "is a method of de-
veloping an equation which relates one variable (such as
a company's sales) to one or more other variables which
should explain the first (such as price, economic demands,
competition, etc.). This method is mathematically con-
trived so that the resulting combinations of explanatory
variables produces the smallest error between the historic
actual values and those estimated by the regression."
McLagan, A Non-econometrician's Guide to Econometrics, 8
Bus. ECON. 38 (1973).
the conditional probability of conviction was, as
hypothesized, greater than the elasticity with re-
spect to the c6nditional probability of execution.
The inclusion of a dummy variable28 in the full
sample equation to account for abolitionist and
retentionist states permitted a' test to be made of
their statistical difference. As Ehrlich stated, "the
only valid inference to be drawn from the estimated
effect of [the dummy variable] is that it indicates
the existence of a statistically significant difference
between the mean rates of murder in executing
and non-executing states after the effects of the
other variables ... have been accounted for." 29 On
the basis of these results, which largely confirmed
and reinforced the findings and conclusions of his
time series study, Ehrlich concluded that
it is noteworthy that all the deterrence variables
examined in this analysis yield the expected results
in connection with murder and other crimes, and
that the coefficients associated with explanatory
variables other than constant terms appear statisti-
cally indistinguishable across different samples as
well as across subsets of executing and non-execut-
ing states.
a°
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, Ehrlich's
work has had a considerable impact on the capital
punishment-deterrence debate. First, his models
represent the first sophisticated econometric at-
tempts at isolating and evaluating the marginal
effect of an execution on the murder rate. Second,
this conclusion that the execution of a convicted
murderer will deter potential murderers and thus
save the lives of would-be victims cannot be re-
garded too lightly, despite the existence of a num-
ber of criticisms of his work tending to diminish
the actual impact of his findings. Given these
criticisms (to be examined in the next section) and
the questionable validity of the statistical and the-
oretical assumptions underlying both Ehrlich's
methodology and more generally the application
of econometrics to this problem (discussed in the
previous section), Ehrlich's work cannot be said to
have proven the deterrence hypothesis, but it has
cast some doubt on the belief that capital punish-
ment no longer serves any of the legitimate or
28 The dummy variable assigns a value of I to reten-
tionist states and a 0 to abolitionist states. The purpose
is to see if there is any significant difference in the legal
status of the death penalty among states.
2 Ehrlich, supra note 26, at 757.
30 Id. at 778.
historical societal goals of retribution, rehabilita-
tion, and deterrence.
CRITICS OF EHRLICH AND His RESPONSES
There are three basic categories in which criti-
cisms of Ehrlich's study may be grouped: data
imperfections, methodological problems, and ques-
tionable assumptions. The most basic attack is
leveled at the inadequacies of the data used in the
study. Ehrlich relied on Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation data as reported in the Uniform Crime
Reports compiled annually by voluntary submis-
sion by local police departments. At best, these
statistics represent no more than a sampling of
total crime, and although this source may be the
best set of nationwide data around, there is still
much doubt as to its reliability for econometric
.31
use.
Related to the issue of data reliability is the time
period and frequency used in the actual regression.
Ehrlich's time series analysis spanned the period
1933-1969 and involved annual data for the
United States on an aggregate level. However, the
inclusion of the years after 1960 may have pro-
duced a deterrent effect which is spurious in nature.
The last execution in the United States (excluding
the recent Gary Gilmore incident in Utah) took
place in 1967. Over time, the absolute numbers of
executions have been decreasing: 1,667 for 1930-
39, 1,284 for 1940-49, 717 for 1950-59, and 191
for 1960-69 (of which 145 occurred between 1960
and 1962).32 Although this distinct downward
trend presents problems in itself (for example, the
difficulty in accounting for political decisions, so-
cial factors, and value changes which might lie
behind this decline in the use of the death penalty),
it is clear from the figures that inclusion of the
1960's data may distort the results since executions
were declining while homicide rates were increas-
ing significantly. 3 That is, Ehrlich's use of the
1960's data, the period when the death penalty
was discontinued as a means of punishment, may
have produced spurious estimated coefficients of
the regression variables. A recent study found this
problem to be of a critical nature:
:" Bowers & Pierce, 7he Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac
Ehrlich's Research and Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 187
(1975).
:r2 Board of Prisons, National Prisoner Statistics: Cap-
ital Punishment 1930-68. 8 (1969).
' These trends raise the important question of whether
and to what extent the decline in and the end of execu-
tions during the 1960's caused the sharp rise in the
homicide rate. See Klein, Forst & Filatov, supra note 22,
at 345.
In fact, the real contribution to the strength of
Ehrlich's statistical finding lies in the simple graph
of the upsurge of the homicide rate after 1962,
coupled with the fall in the execution rate in the
same period. The whole statistical story lies in this
simple pairing of these observations and not in the
theoretical utility model, the econometric type spec-
ification, or the use of best econometric method.
Everything else is relatively superficial and domi-
nated by this simple statistical observation.3
Moreover, this criticism of Ehrlich's research has
been accepted by Justice Marshall, dissenting in
Gregg:
The most compelling criticism of the Ehrlich study
is that its conclusions are extremely sensitive to the
choice of the time period included in the regression
analysis. Analysis of Ehrlich's data reveals that all
empirical support for the deterrent effect of capital
punishment disappears when the five most recent
years are removed from his time series-that is to
say, whether a decrease in the execution rate corre-
sponds to an increase or decrease in the murder rate
depends on the ending point of the sample period.
This finding has cast severe doubts on the reliability
of Ehrlich's tentative conclusions.3
Aside from the criticisms directed at Ehrlich's
time series, there have been criticisms aimed at the
methodology employed by Ehrlich in his studies.
One alleged flaw involves the procedural aspects
used by Ehrlich in constructing his model. As
indicated in one study:
[Ehrlich's] analysis is extraordinary at least insofar
as it employs a vast array of manipulations: to
create values of missing data, to test alternative
time-lag structures to reduce bias or efficiency loss
associated with autoregressive disturbances, to avoid
undefined values of central interest, and to test
alternative systems of simultaneity. 36
Second, even small errors in estimates of any of
the variables used in constructing the deterrence
variables could produce an unusually strong but
spurious appearance of a deterrent effect.3 7 Mea-
surement errors tend to bias the regression coeffi-
cients towards zero. In Ehrlich's study, the "errors
in these crucial variables-(homicides, probability
of apprehension, probability of conviction)-all
appear to work in such a way as to bias the
'4 Id. at 344-45.
: 4 28 U.S. at 235-36 (footnote.'s omitted).
"4 Klein, Forsit & Filatov, supra note 22, at 339.
'n Zeiscl, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty: Facts
and Faith, 1976 Sup. CT. R.v. 317, 335 (1976).
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coefficient of (the execution rate) negatively. ' ' ss In
response, Ehrlich has contended that even if these
measurement errors do exist, they would generally
lead to the underestimation in a regression analysis
of the true effects of an explanatory variable subject
to random measurement imperfections.s In either
case, the root of the problem is still the lack of
reliable historical period, a defect not likely to be
corrected.
The national approach adopted by Ehrlich in
his first study tends to conceal the impact and
effects of state and regional differences. For in-
stance, on an aggregate level, if one state shows an
increase in executions and another a decrease in
homicides, the overall effect might appear to be
one of deterrence which would not exist at all.'
Furthermore, a time series approach lacks many of
the desirable properties of a cross-sectional analysis
which
provides the potential for a more thoroughly con-
trolled estimate of the effect of changes in elasticities
on homicides not only by way of the existence of
large inter-regional variation in several of the in-
cluded variables, the incorporation of regional
dummy variable, and a corresponding reduction in
aggregation bias, but also by way of the opportunity
to include a term-of-imprisonment variable, which
is not available in time series.4'
The functional specification used by Ehrlich has
also been criticized. Ehrlich assumed a multipli-
*1 Klein, Forst & Filatov, supra note 22, at 348-49.
:3 Ehrlich, Deterrence: Evidence and Inference, 85 YALE L.J.
209, 213 (1975).
"" Baldus & Cole, A Comparison of the Work of Thorsten
Sellin and Isaac Ehrlich on the Deterrent Effect of Capital
Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 170, 176 (1975). Justice Mar-
shall, dissenting in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976),
recognized this point explicitly:
It has been suggested, for example, that the study
is defective because it compares execution and hom-
icide rates on a nationwide, rather than a state-by-
state, basis. The aggregation of data from all
states-including those that have abolished the
death penalty-obscures the relationship between
murder and execution rates. Under Ehrlich's meth-
odology, a decrease in the execution risk in one
State combined with an increase in the murder rate
in another State would, all other things being equal,
suggest a deterrent effect that quite obviously would
not exist. Indeed, a deterrent effect would be sug-
gested if, once again all other things being equal,
one State abolished the death penalty and experi-
enced no change in the murder rate, while another
State experienced an increase in the murder rate.
Id. U.S. at 234-35 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnotes
omitted).
"' Klein, Forst & Filatov, supra note 22, at 341.
cative equation in the nature of the Cobb-Douglas
production function; 42 the regression was estimated
using the natural logarithmic values of the vari-
ables as a means of transforming the specified
relationship into an equivalent linear form. Some
studies, attempting to duplicate Ehrlich's work but
not using log transformations have concluded that
the deterrence impact is a statistical artifact, in
essence a result of the functional specification.
4 3
While it is true that the incorrect use of the loga-
rithmic form can cause relatively small values for
the risk of execution to appear to be statistical
aberrations influencing the regression fit, this same
problem may exist with respect to a linear form for
the same values." The data available for a study
will often play a crucial role in determining
whether a non-linear specification should be used.
In Ehrlich's case, there does not appear to be any
reason dictating against the use of a non-linear
specification. In fact, Ehrlich claimed that his ap-.
proach represents a superior format because the
magnitude of the errors in his data is approxi-
mately proportional to the level of the variables
the data are purporting to measure. For this reason,
Ehrlich believed his results are not exclusively de-
pendent on the specific functional form chosen but
are basically unaffected qualitatively by this
choice.
45
In any regression using ordinary least squares, a
critical property is the inclusion of all relevant
variables. Omitted variables will seriously bias the
estimated coefficients of the deteirence variables as
well as the associated standard errors." Ehrlich
himself admitted the presence of this statistical
problem in his time series analysis. In his cross-
sectional study, Ehrlich included variables such as
the severity of imprisonment for murder and other
crimes which are not available over time.47 The
variables omitted from the time series regression
equation are first, a proxy measure for individuals
who are undeterred by social sanctions against
murder for other reasons such as the absence of
strong family ties or lack of friends,48 and second,
variables representing migration from rural to ur-
42 See note 20 supra.
43See Bowers & Pierce, supra note 31, at 199; Baldus
& Cole, supra note 40, at 185.
"Peck, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Ehrlich
and His Critics, 85 YALE L.J. 359, 361 (1976).
4Ehrlich, supra note 39, at 217-18.
4Passell, supra note 2, at 66.
47 Ehrlich, supra note 26, at 742.
48 Passell, supra note 2, at 66.
ban areas, per capita ownership of guns, and the
level of violent crimes against property.
49
Ehrlich found that conviction rates would de-
crease as executions increased. 5° Given the nature
of ordinary least squares regression analysis, the
trade-off between the homicide rate and the exe-
cution rate depends upon holding constant all the
other variables in the system, including the appre-
hension and conviction rates."' Since both of these
deterrence variables were found to have negative
effects on the homicide rate, this implies that the
effect of a decline in the conviction rate will offset
the effect of an increase in the execution rate, and
in fact will outweigh it given the magnitude of
their elasticities.52 Given this reasoning, it is con-
sistent with the conclusion that an increase in
executions will cause a net increase, not decrease,
in the homicide rate.53
The final criticism may be the most damaging
to the credibility of Ehrlich's findings, and is di-
rectly related to the earlier criticism concerning the
time period chosen. Econometric theory teaches
that if the results of a time series regression are an
accurate representation of the underlying causal
processes, then the values of the estimated coeffi-
cients will be independent of specified time periods.
Although neither Ehrlich nor his critics did any
rigorous testing for structural changes over the
sample period, one study, attempting to duplicate
Ehrlich's equation, found that all evidence of de-
terrence disappears when the last five years are
dropped from the regression. 54 This should not be
too surprising since inclusion of the 1960's in the
time interval may drastically distort the results
because executions dropped dramatically or were
eliminated while homicide rates increased signifi-
cantly.s In examining the inclusion of the 1960's
49 Baldus & Cole, supra note 40, at 180.
0 Ehrlich postulated that any exogenous factor caus-
ing a decline in the severity of punishment for murder
via a decline in the conditional probability of execution
given conviction will increase the probability of convic-
tion, since the marginal costs of conviction will decrease
but its marginal revenue will increase. That is, the rates
of execution and conviction are substitutes with respect
to the costs of each activity. Ehrlich, supra note 2, at 405-
06.
51 Passell, supra note 2, at 64.
52 The sign of the elasticities (estimated coefficients)
and their magnitude conform to the general theoretical
expectations that the elasticity with respect to the appre-
hension ratio is the largest, the execution ratio elasticity
the smallest. Ehrlich, supra note 2, at 401, 411.
53 Baldus & Cole, supra note 40, at 182; Passell, supra
note 2, at 64.
54 Bowers & Pierce, supra note 31, at 197-98.
55 Sit text accompanying note 28 supra.
in a regression analysis, a recent study has con-
cluded that "ending the practice of capital punish-
ment in the 1960's does not constitute a controlled
experiment from which one can safely draw con-
clusions about deterrence by observing only homi-
cides and executions. Factors other than the ending
of capital punishment severely affected the homi-
cide rate during this period." 56
Ehrlich, however, did do some testing of his
temporal specification by dropping some of the
earlier and later years. His test results showed no
appreciable change in the elasticity of the homicide
rate with respect to the execution variable.57 How-
ever, Ehrlich has indicated that this criticism of his
model is unjustified because "[slelective elimina-
tion of a sufficient number of observations from a
regression analysis is a virtually foolproof method
for reversing any single result derived from an
original sample."
5
Moreover, Ehrlich has claimed that the elimi-
nation of the data points relating to murders in the
1960's (over 17% of Ehrlich's sample) amounts to,
in effect, the selective, non-random exclusion of
observations crucial to an efficient estimation. This
is especially true when the observations omitted
(1960's) significantly reduce the variability in the
estimate of the execution rate. The rate of change
in executions had been stable over the 1940's and
1950's but declined sharply in the 1960's, accu-
rately reflecting the true risk of execution. Thus,
eliminating these years and the corresponding var-
iability seriously affects the magnitude of the esti-
mated coefficients by reducing the overall varia-
bility in the estimates of the execution rate. 9
This change in the coefficients resulting from the
choice of various time intervals could be the result
of a structural change or shift over time, or the
result of an incorrect specification of the model for
the entire time period. ° In any case, the instability
of the coefficients indicates there is a possibility
that the deterrent effect is spurious. Ehrlich should
have more rigorously tested the structural stability
of his equation; the fact that he may have done so
but did not present the results casts a shadow on
his findings.
Given Ehrlich's findings, the criticisms of his
work, and his rebuttals, it is difficult to formulate
and defend any position regarding the deterrence
"6 Klein, Forst & Filatov, supra note 22, at 345.
57 Bowers & Pierce, supra note 31, at 197; Ehrlich, supra
note 2, at 409-16.
8 Ehrlich, supra note 39, at 214.
9 Id. at 214-16.
r0 Peck, supra note 44, at 361.
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hypothesis. A recent study has wisely concluded
that
it seems unthinkable to us to base decisions in the
use of the death penalty on Ehrlich's findings, as
the Solicitor General of the United States has urged.
They simply are not sufficiently powerful, robust,
or tested at this stage to warrant use in such an
important case.... It is not that Ehrlich's estimates
are demonstrably wrong; it is merely that they are
too uncertain and must, at best, be interpreted as
tentative at this stage.
There is nothing wrong with Ehrlich's particular
numerical findings. His arithmetic is correct; his
formulation is imaginative; but application to the
most serious of issues is premature. In short, we see
too many plausible explanations for his finding a
deterrent effect other than the theory that capital
punishment deters murder. 
EVIDENCE OF No DETERRENT EFFECT
Much of the recent literature on the topic of
capital punishment and deterrence has focused on
Ehrlich's findings, analyzing and critiquing his
hypothesis and methodology. This interest has
stimulated the development of several econometric
models designed to test and identify the causal
relationship between the death penalty and homi-
cides, usually with a goal of refuting Ehrlich's
conclusions. These modeling attempts are sophis-
ticated additions to the graphical and statistical
analyses of the 1960's and 1970's, which could not
find any significantly acceptable evidence of deter-
rence. The studies and findings of these groups (the
chartists-comparativists and the econometricians)
are deserving of recognition and are discussed
briefly in this section. While the impact of these
research projects has not been as strong as Ehr-
lich's, it is nevertheless important to be aware of
the fact that statistical evidence contrary to Ehr-
lich's does exist. It must be borne in mind, of
course, that neither position has been conclusively
established or accepted.
Chartist-Comparativists: Sellin and the Matching
Technique
The principal studies concluding that the use of
capital punishment does not deter homicides have
been done by Thorsten Sellin.62 His first attempt
to isolate a deterrent effect was simply an exami-
nation of what happened with respect to the hom-
icide rates in those states which abolished the death
61 Klein, Forst & Filatov, supra note 22, at 358.
6 Sellin Experiments, note 2 supra; Sellin Homicides,
note 2 supra.
penalty and later reinstituted the punishment. Us-
ing a comparative analytical scheme, Sellin con-
cluded that "there is no evidence that the abolition
of the death penalty generally causes an increase
in criminal homicides or that its reintroduction is
followed by a decline.' ' 3
Recognizing that few states have changed poli-
cies in this manner and thus that this finding did
not have great probative value, Sellin extended the
scope of his inquiry by comparing contiguous re-
tentionist and abolitionist states. This implicitly
assumes that neighboring states are similar in terms
of economic, social, political, and demographic
conditions, an assumption that is difficult to justify
empirically. The purpose of this "matching" tech-
nique was to test the hypothesis that states that
have abolished the death penalty have lower hom-
icide rates than states that have retained capital
punishment. The rate of murders and non-negli-
gent manslaughters were compared over the period
1920 to 1963. Since actual capital murders are
hidden in the data but are the relevant variable, it
was necessary for Sellin to make the implicit and
crucial, though unproven, assumption that the pro-
portion of capital to total murders remains con-
stant over time. On the basis of this comparative
analysis, Sellin found that
[an inspection of the figures shows (1) that the level
of the rates is not the same in all regions; (2) that
within each group of contiguous states it would be
impossible to identify the abolitionist state, were it
not designated as such; and (3) that the trends of
the rates of the states compared are similar. The
conclusion is inevitable that the presence of the
death penalty-in law or practice-does not influ-
ence homicide death rates.6
Other studies have adopted the approach and
methodology of Sellin and have arrived at the same
results. For instance, Chambliss reported that a
preponderance of his evidence indicates that capi-
tal punishment does not act as a deterrent to
murder.r5 His comparative research demonstrated
63 Sellin Experiments, supra note 2, at 124.
6 Sellin Homicides, supra note 2, at 136. Sellin paired
sets of contiguous states in order to match the homicide
rates of retentionist and abolitionist states. Six pairings
were examined, the abolitionist states being listed first:
Maine with Vermont and New Hampshire, Rhode Island
with Massachusetts and Connecticut, Minnesota and
Iowa with Wisconsin, Michigan with Indiana and Ohio,
Kansas with Missouri and Colorado, and North Dakota
and South Dakota (until 1939) with Nebraska.
6s Chambliss, Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness of
Legal Sanctions, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 703 (1968). In reaching
his conclusions, Chambliss compared the number of per-
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three facts: first, that murder rates had remained
constant from 1951-1966 despite a trend away from
the use of capital punishment; second, that within
the United States, there is no significant difference
in the murder rate between abolitionist and reten-
tionist states, and third, that the possible conse-
quences of the act of murder are not considered by
the murderer at the time of the commission of the
crime.
Similarly, a research effort by Savitz analyzed
the homicide rate in Philadelphia before and after
highly publicized executions in order to test the
hypothesis that the deterrence impact will be most
effective during the days following executions in a
locality where the crime was committed and/or
where the criminal was known.6 This study con-
cluded that "there was no significant decrease or
increase in the murder rate following the imposi-
tion of the death penalty on four separate occa-
sions."
67
These studies are the most reliable non-econo-
metric evidence that the death penalty serves no
deterrence purpose. Sellin's findings have been
cited as superior to Ehrlich's because of the exis-
tence of several significant factors in his study, but
absent from Ehrlich's: (1) the choice of variables
and the way the threat of capital punishment is
measured; (2) the use of state rather than national
data; (3) the techniques used to control for the
influence of other variables affecting homicide
rates; and (4) the consistency of the findings.
6
8
Sellin's work has also found support and accept-
sons executed with the homicide rate for each year from
1951 to 1966 and found that the murder rate did not
appear to be connected with executions. Second, Chain-
bliss did a Sellin-type analysis and concluded that the
annual average murder rate in selected contiguous states
(each pairing having one retentionist and one abolitionist
state) were not significantly different.
66 Savitz, A Study in Capital Punishment, 49 J. CRIM. L.C.
& P.S. 338 (1958). Specifically, Savitz examined four case
studies, concentrating on the eight-week period before
and after the sentence of death to determine what the
effect would be on the commission of capital crimes. On
an individual basis, Savitz found somewhat of a decrease
after sentencing, yet when the data from all four were
combined, the impact was insignificant. In the period
before imposition, 43 total capital crimes were reported
of which 23 were definitely capital in nature and 20 were
possibles; in the period after, 41 total capital crimes
occurred, 28 being defined as definites. The total decrease
in capital crimes measured 4%, caused principally by a
sharp decline in possible capital crimes.
67Id. at 341.
68 For a more detailed comparison of Ehrlich and
Sellin, see Baldus & Cole, supra note 40, at 185-86.
ance in judicial quarters. In a Massachusetts deci-
sion addressing the question of the imposition of
death in a rape-murder case, a concurring judge
argued that a
review of the available studies and other materials
cited reveals no firm indication that capital punish-
ment acts as a superior deterrent to homicide than
other available punishments. At best the evidence
is equivocal. I am thus unable to find that the
Commonwealth has a compelling interest in deter-
rence which cannot adequately be served by other
less restrictive means of punishment. 69
Justice Marshall also examined Sellin's statistical
evidence and concluded in Furman that "Sellin's
statistics demonstrate that there is no correlation
between the murder rate and the presence or ab-
sence of the capital sanction."
70
Despite the general acceptance of his findings,
Sellin's research, like Ehrlich's, has been subjected
to critical review. The major criticism by econo-
metricians charges that Sellin's methods do not
present a systematic test of the main implications
of general deterrence theory; that is, that potential
offenders respond to incentives. In this respect,
Sellin's use of the legal status of the death penalty
as a means of comparison has been deemed mis-
leading since the relevant variable is the actual risk
of execution. 71 More specifically, Ehrlich has con-
cluded that Sellin's efforts are nothing more than
informal tests of the sign of the simple correlation
between the legal status of the death penalty and
the murder rate across states and over time in a few
states. Studies performing this test have not consid-
ered systematically the actual enforcement of the
death penalty, which may be a far more important
factor affecting an offender's behavior than the legal
status of the death penalty. Moreover, these studies
have generally ignored other parameters character-
izing law enforcement activity against murders,
such as the probability of apprehension and the
conditional probability of conviction, which appear
to be systematically related to the probability of
punishment by execution. In addition, the direction
of the causal relationship between the rate of mur-
der and the probabilities of conviction, apprehen-
sion and execution is not obvious, since a high
murder rate may generate an upward adjustment
in the levels of these probabilities in accordance
with optimal law enforcement. Thus the sign of the
simple correlation between the murder rate and the
' Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 339 N.E.2d 676, 685
(Mass. 1975) (Tauro, C.J., concurring) (footnotes omit-
ted).
70 408 U.S. at 350 (Marshall, J., concurring).
7' Ehrlich, supra note 39, at 222.
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legal status, or even the effective use of capital
punishment, cannot provide conclusive evidence for
or against the existence of a deterrent effect. 2
Furthermore, argue the Sellin critics, it was not
possible to have a random assignment of treatment
levels in Sellin's comparative approach because the
data were not generated in a controlled experiment
and the choice of the state pairings was subjective
and deliberate.73 In addition to the absence of
laboratory conditions underlying Sellin's ap-
proach, there are basic structural problems as well:
the similar areas are not similar enough; the periods
are not long enough; many social differences and
changes, other than the abolition of the death pen-
alty, may account for the variation (or lack o) in
homicide rates with and without, before and after
abolition; some of these social differences and
changes are likely to have affected homicide rates.74
Finally, it has been claimed that Sellin's matching
technique also ignores the possible response of pun-
ishment policies to homicide rates-if a high or
rising homicide rate leads one state to institute the
death penalty and low or falling rates lead other
states to abolish it, retentionist states would tend
to have higher homicide rates. This result by itself
could cancel out a possible negative correlation
which would be produced if the penalty were in
fact an effective deterrent.7 5
Econometricians and the Death Penalty
There have been several major research efforts
which have econometrically tested the deterrence
hypothesis of Ehrlich, but have arrived at contra-
dictory results. All of these models failed to find
any significant evidence that capital punishment
influences the homicide rate.
The Bowers and Pierce study, for example, tested
the Ehrlich conclusions by attempting to duplicate
Ehrlich's model.76 Specifically, this study focused
on the criticism of Ehrlich that the deterrent effect
disappears when certain years of data are deleted
from the analysis. The results indicated that the
coefficients of the deterrence variables are not neg-
ative as expected, but rather are predominantly
positive and become even more so as additional
years are deleted.77 However, this study is not
72 Ehrlich, supra note 2, at 415.
73 For a critical analysis of Sellin's matching technique,
see Peck, supra note 44, at 364.
74 Van den Haag, supra note 5, at 145-46.
Peck, supra note 44, at 364.
'"Bowers & Pierce, supra note 31, at 204-05.
,7Id.
conclusive as either a rejection of Ehrlich's findings
or as an independent finding tending to establish
that there is no deterrence effect. The data used by
Bowers and Pierce were not the same as that used
by Ehrlich since Ehrlich had not released his sta-
tistical base at that time.78 Furthermore, the inter-
vals used by Bowers and Pierce were different from
Ehrlich's study since this study ended in 1963 and
Ehrlich's study included data up to 1969.
Passell1h estimated a cross-sectional model simi-
lar to the cross-sectional equations of Ehrlich. This
study focused on the years 1950 and 1960, com-
pared to Ehrlich's concentration on 1940 and 1950.
Another significant difference between the two
models is that Passell's deterrence variables were
constructed somewhat differently. Passell's version
included the perceived probability of punishment
(defined as the subjective probability of arrest and
the probability of conviction given arrest), the
length of the prison sentences of those convicted
but not executed, and the typical execution vari-
able. Other variables inserted in the equation were
a demographic adjustment for age groups, an eco-
nomic adjustment for income groups, and a social
and family relationship adjustment. Using both
ordinary and two-stage least squares estimation
techniques, Passell found the execution rate to be
positive but insignificant, indicating no deterrent
effect. Although Passell did utilize sophisticated
statistical techniques to achieve these results, he
nevertheless concluded that "it cannot be proven
that executions do not serve as a deterrent to
murder. Proof is simply beyond the capacities of
empirical social science. At a minimum, however,
students of capital punishment must look elsewhere
for evidence confirming deterrence.
' ' 0
Forst also estimated a cross-sectional model, in
testing the Ehrlich results, but concentrated on the
years 1960 and 1970, representing a period when
the rate of executions was falling dramatically but
the homicide rate was rising8s These years were
considered to be the best available to test the
hypothesis that "to the extent that capital punish-
ment deters homicides, the homicide rate should
have increased by the largest amounts from 1960
to 1970, ceteris paribus, in those states with the
greatest reductions in the probability that a person
78 Since then, Ehrlich has apparently relented and
allowed Klein, Forst, and Filatov use of the data in their
study. See Klein, Forst & Filatov, supra note 22, at 352.
79 Passell, note 2 supra
Id. at 79-80.
81 Forst, note 2 supra.
19791
convicted of murder would be executed."8 2 Forst
included a wide range of variables in his equation
specifications, including Passell's three deterrence
factors and various social, demographic, and eco-
nomic variables. Using ordinary least squares to
estimate the equations, Forst could not find any
support for the deterrence hypothesis with respect
to the risk of execution, although the probability
of conviction coefficient was negative and signifi-
cant, suggesting that a higher risk of conviction
would serve as a more efficient deterrent force than
the risk of death. Although it has been suggested
that Forst's findings are spurious, they nevertheless
indicate that the certainty of punishment may be
a more effective deterrent than its severity.ss With
regard to executions alone, Forst went beyond
Passell and asserted affirmatively that
the finding that capital punishment ... does not
deter homicide is remarkably robust with respect to
a wide range of alternative constructions of the
execution rate, alternate assumptions about simul-
taneity among the crime and sanction variables,
whether or not the observations are weighted, and
the inclusion of different subsets of available control
variables.
The results of this analysis suggest ... that it is
erroneous to view capital punishment as a means of
reducing the homicide rate.84
While these econometric studies do seem to raise
questions regarding the Ehrlich findings, they are
subject to criticisms as well, including many dis-
cussed in relation to Ehrlich's methodology. Thus,
at this point, it is apparent that there is credible
empirical evidence on both sides concerning the
deterrence effect of capital punishment, although
no definitive study has yet been done. Furthermore,
it can hardly be asserted with certainty that any
empirical study will conclusively resolve the issue,
although additional empirical research will yield
valuable new evidence, permitting a more in-
formed judgment to be made about this controver-
sial issue. The next section presents the results of
another empirical attempt to isolate, identify and
measure econometrically the deterrent impact of
capital punishment on homicide rates.
ADDITIONAL EvIDENCE ON DETERRENCE
The following analysis has been purposefully
designed to account for many of the problems
identified in other econometric models and to in-
2 Id. at 749.
" Id. at 763.
4 Id. at 764.
corporate methods aimed at ameliorating these
defects. As already noted, there are problems which
are inherent in attempting to estimate an econo-
metric model of the death penalty, and this study
is no different. However, by accounting for the
criticisms of prior modeling efforts, this analysis
presents a new and theoretically more valuable
and acceptable approach.
Thus far, the statistical efforts aimed at isolating
the effects of capital punishment have proceeded
along three basic lines of inquiry: (1) econometric
models using time series; (2) cross-sectional data
studies; and (3) a matching or "paired-compari-
son" framework. An analytical scheme utilizing
time series is valuable because the movement over
time of independent or exogenous variables can
explain much of what "causally" determines any
dependent or endogenous variable. The principal
disadvantage of time series, however, is that in a
number of instances many of the key explanatory
variables may not be available either for a given
historical time period or for a sufficient length of
time to insure adequate degrees of freedom.
Cross-sectional analysis solves this problem by
allowing "the researcher to observe larger differ-
ences in the relevant factors, to control for specific
regional effects, and to include potentially impor-
tant factors about which information is not avail-
able on an annual basis."so Yet, all of the cross-
sectional and time-series studies done so far have
failed to resolve the deterrence controversy, and
this has potentially serious implications:
The failure of these cross-sectional studies to find a
significant deterrent effect is similar to discrepancies
that have arisen in econometric investigations of
consumer spending. In national time-series samples,
there is evidence of significant positive association,
at the margin, between an index of consumer atti-
tudes and spending on durable goods; but in cross-
section samples, with family-to-family variation,
this same effect cannot readily be found. This lack
of correspondence between the time-series and cross-
section findings has always cast some doubt on the
validity of the former. It has also been the case that
significant time-series effects have not always car-
ried over from sample to extrapolation. There have
been serious enough reversals in appraisals of the
macro-economy through methods based on time-
series that we may be led by analogy to mistrust the
policy extrapolation of Ehrlich's time series results
in the absence of cross-section as well as other
confirmations of his findings.
a
s Id. at 747 (footnotes omitted).
Klein, Forst & Filatov, supra note 22, at 342.
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However, by combining both of these analyses
into a technique known as pooled cross-sectional
time series analysis, a different analytical approach
may be taken in which less historical data are
needed because the cross-sectional data compen-
sate for the loss in yearly information. Further, a
greater number of relevant variables can be in-
cluded because of their increased availability. By
examining and comparing states and regions in a
way comparable to the matching technique of
Sellin, additional comparative information is ob-
tained reflecting the relative deterrent impact of
capital punishment. Thus, it seems logical that the
next step in the attempt to estimate econometri-
cally the influence of executions on homicides
should combine all three methodologies in order to
obtain additional evidence on this controversial
issue. As one economist has noted in critiquing the
work done thus far, a major improvement in this
field could be accomplished by applying econo-
metric techniques to time-series data across states
or regions in ways which, to a considerable extent,
will bring the analysis closer to the paired-compar-
ison method.87
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The approach taken in this attempt to test the
deterrence hypothesis involves ordinary least
squares in a pooled cross-sectional time-series
framework. The principal advantage is that move-
ments of the dependent variable (the rate of hom-
icide) can be explained by the variances of the
independent variables both over time and across
regions or states, thus providing additional infor-
mation as to the true relationship existing between
variables. Although this approach does increase
the number of observations in a regression com-
pared to the cross-sectional or time-series approach
alone, other things being equal, there is the disad-
vantage that it is not possible to correct for inter-
dependencies among the variables by resort to two-
stage least squares.
Two basic situations are selected in which to test
the deterrence hypothesis. First, the national data
is disaggregated to a regional level to see if varia-
tions between various sections of the country offer
any additional evidence. In both the regional and
the state-by-state equations, the sophisticated pool-
ing technique of cross-sectional data over time is
used. The second scenario involves an analysis of
state data; this level of disaggregation is designed
to discover what, if any, information can be ob-
" Peck, supra note 44, at 367.
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tained by accounting for individual state experi-
ences.
As is the case in many statistical studies, the
interval chosen for the period of estimation is dic-
tated by the availability of data. In choosing the
interval, the goal is to isolate those years in which
the death penalty represents a commonly utilized
form of punishment. All years after 1960 are de-
leted for the equations since the number of execu-
tions fell dramatically during that decade, and
none occurred after 1967. The time span 1940 to
1960 seems best suited to fulfilling this goal; unfor-
tunately, some of the relevant economic, demo-
graphic, and crime variables are not available dur-
ing the earlier years on a state or regional basis.
For this reason, the regressions are performed over
the subperiod 1950-1960.
This approach to the choice of the estimation
interval is subject to the same criticism that Ehr-
lich's research has drawn, that is, that the elimi-
nation of certain years amounts to, in effect, the
selective, non-stochastic exclusion of observations
which are arguably crucial to a reliable estimation
of the key deterrence variables.ss "The principle
argument against changing the sample to investi-
gate only the period up to 1962 is that valuable
statistical observations are lost-not simply the
observations that make the case, but observations
that contribute in a general way to the overall
number of degrees of freedom, which are precious,
and in short supply for the analysis of the problem
at hand."' Theoretically it is true that the non-
random exclusion of data does eliminate valuable
information, but here this loss of data may not be
as critical an issue, since the deletion of observa-
tions and the information carried with them by
restricting the interval to 1950-1960 is offset by the
additional information gained through the use of
temporal cross-sectional data matrices.
Furthermore, even though the availability of
data is often a constraint on the estimation period
which can be selected, the estimated coefficients
are, other things being equal, expected to be un-
biased in the ordinary least squares situation, al-
though the confidence interval may be wider as a
result. Finally, if the death penalty really does have
a deterrent effect, the 1950-1960 time period rep-
resents a good interval over which to test the
hypothesis for several reasons. First, although the
Uniform Crime Reports do have reporting and
compilation deficiencies, this source is nevertheless
88 Ehrlich, supra note 39, at 209.



















MNEUMONICS FOR VARIABLES USED IN THE REGRESSION EQUATIONS
Variable
homicide rate per 100,000 (murders and non-negligent manslaughters)
probability of apprehension (per cent of murders cleared by arrests)
conditional probability of being convicted of offense charged (murder)
given apprehension
per cent of executions occurring in the U.S. in a state or region
number of executions in a given year divided by number convicted in
previous year
per cent of nonwhites in varying population age groups
per capita government expenditures as reflected by tax revenues
resident population
national unemployment rate and the rate for selected age groups
per cent of U.S. population between 15 and 24
per capita income
labor force participation rate
the best available and is generally considered to be
more accurate for post- 1950 periods than for earlier
years of publication."° Second, there is no signifi-
cant trend in the use of capital punishment during
this period as compared to the 1960's. Finally, the
death penalty was still considered to be an accept-
able form of punishment in the 1950's as compared
to the abolitionist trend of the 1960's.
As noted, the crime data used in these regressions
are taken from the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR)
published by the Department of Justice. The only
exception is the number of executions, which is
compiled by the justice Department in the Na-
tional Prisoner Statistics Bulletin. The economic
and social variables used in this analysis are from
three principal sources, the Bureau of the Census
(Commerce Department), the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (Labor Department), and the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (Commerce Department).
In all of the regressions, the dependent or endog-
enous variable is the rate of homicides (defined as
murders and non-negligent manslaughters) per
100,000 persons. The independent or exogenous
("explanatory") variables reflect the deterrent ef--
fects of apprehension, conviction, and execution
and the impact of various economic/social/demo-
graphic factors.
As Table A illustrates, the first deterrence vari-
able is the probability of being apprehended for
murder in the United States (PA@US) or in a
region (PA@ region); individual state data are not














available for this concept. This probability is de-
rived from the percentage of murders cleared by
arrests.91 PGOC@US is the conditional probability
of being convicted of the offense of murder given
apprehension for the entire United States. Since no
state or regional data is available for this concept,
the national variable is used in all levels of analysis.
This deterrence variable is measured by the num-
ber of persons found guilty once charged. Finally,
the conditional probability of being executed given
conviction is measured in two ways. First, for the
United States only, PE1 is the number of execu-
tions in a given year divided by the number con-
victed in the previous year. The variation of this
variable is the per cent of all executions in the
United States occurring in a given state (E%US@
state) or region (E%US@ region). This latter mea-
sure is designed to capture the effect, if any, of
publicity and the subjective fear of being executed
in a given state. The sign of each deterrent variable
is expected to be negative, and the magnitude of
the elasticities is expected to range from apprehen-
sion (largest) to executions (smallest).
The remaining explanatory variables are chosen
by hypothesizing which economic and social fac-
tors are most likely to exert significant influence on
the murder rate. Variables representing the per
cent of non-whites in varying population-age
groups (%NW15@24, %NW25@34) in the United
States are designed to isolate the effect of race
on homicide rates. Per capita state or regional
91 A murder is "cleared" for reporting purposes when
a suspect is actually arrested for that murder.
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TABLE B-I
REGIONAL BASIS: MURDER RATES REGRESSED AGAINST SELECTED VARIABLES (1950-1960)I
Vaibe(I (2) (3)3
Variable E.C. S.E. E.C. S.E. E.C. S.E. 4
Constant -368.509 602.500 -376.063 485.000 -1018.590 489.000
PA2  -0.025 0.031 -0.032 0.030 0.021 0.416
PGOC@US 10.781 29.170 25.632 19.430 0.784 1.784
PEI 4.483 35.030 - - - -
E%US - - 1.799 1.552 0.063 0.230
%NW15@24 155.982 619.800 - - - -
%NW25@34 -774.514 506.400 - .- - -
%NW15@34 - - -642.389 828.500 49.219 25.990
SGF%NR 2  2.235 7.755 0.847 7.696 -0.623 0.194
NR
2  0.150 0.096 0.133 0.096 1.284 0.335
RU -0.712 0.937 - - - -
RU 16@ 19 - - -0.643 0.874 -6.935 2.102
RU20@24 - - 0.067 0.999 2.258 1.525
YP%N2  -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.006 0.012
1 corrected for first-order autocorrelation E.C. = estimated coefficient
2 regional variables S.E. - standard error
3 estimated in logarithms
" The t-statistic is merely the estimated coefficient divided by the standard error.
government expenditures on crime prevention
(SGF%NR@) is reflected by tax revenues, which
represent the budget constraint on what can be
spent.9' As such expenditures increase (as tax rev-
enues increase), the murder rate should, other
things being equal, fall. The resident population of
a given area (available for state and regional levels)
is an indicator of the effects of population density
and tests the hypothesis that more murders will be
committed in more densely populated regions. The
overall national unemployment rate (RU) and the
unemployment rate for selected age groups
(RU16@19, RU20@24) are proxies for the effect
of economic cyclical behavior on well-being and
mental attitudes. YP%N is per capita income for
the United States and individual regions or states
and is included in the equations to identify the
relationship between homicide rates and the expec-
tations resulting from different standards of living.
The labor force participation rate (LC%NR) also
may have an important influence as might the
resident population (NR) and the age distribution
of the population (N15@24).
The Deterrence Hypothesis at the Regional Level
At the regional level, the standard govern-
ment classification is used to group the forty-five-
w The assumption underlying this hypothesis is that
as the amount available for government expenditure
increases, part of this amount will be channeled towards
crime prevention programs.
states: 93 Alaska and Hawaii are left out of both the
state and regional analysis, due to late statehood,
as are Vermont, North Dakota, and South Dakota,
because of poor or unavailable data. An advantage
of doing an analysis on a regional basis lies in the
fact that more crime data is available at this level
than on the state level. Application of a temporal
cross-sectional estimating format in a regional set-
9 The regions contain the following states:
NEW ENGLAND: Connecticut, Maine, Massa-
chusetts, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, Vermont
MIDDLE ATLANTIC: New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania
EAST NORTH CENTRAL: Illinois, Indiana,
Michigan, Ohio,
Wisconsin





SOUTH ATLANTIC: Delaware, Florida, Geor-
gia, Maryland, North Car-
olina, South Carolina, Vir-
ginia, West Viiginia
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL: Alabama, Ken-
tucky, Mississippi,
Tennessee
WEST SOUTH CENTRAL: Arkansas, Louis-
iana, Oklahoma,
Texas
MOUNTAIN: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Mon-
tana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah,
Wyoming
PACIFIC: California, Oregon, Washington
ting has the further advantage of not only produc-
ing overall statistics from the principal equation
but also of permitting analysis of the individual
regions themselves with respect to the causal rela-
tionships specified in the equation. Ordinary least
squares is the regression technique used in these
estimations, and the equations have been corrected
for serial correlation.
Table B-I presents in a condensed form the
results of three regressions run on a regional level.
The left-hand variable in all the equations is once
again the rate of homicide per 100,000, and there
are nine explanatory variables. The first equation
includes as the execution variable the percent of
those executed in a given region to total executions
(PE1). Equation two substitutes regional measures
of the execution rate (EUS) for the national
measure. In addition, the race variables are com-
bined into one (%NW15@34) and the unemploy-
ment rate is split into two age groups (RU16@19,
RU20@24). The third regression is the same as the
second except it is estimated in logarithms.
In these equations, both the execution and the
conviction rate variables are insignificant and pos-
itive. The substitution of execution measures
(E%US for PEI) does not significantly alter these
findings. Surprisingly, the probability of apprehen-
sion at the regional level is statistically insignificant
in all three specifications; this contrasts with the
substantial deterrence effect found at the state level
(see Tables -1, C-2, and C-3). Although the signs
of the estimated coefficients of several of the other
explanatory variables are different from what was
expected, most are not significant, and a high
degree of confidence cannot be placed in these
results. When equation two is estimated in natural
logarithms (equation three), two variables change
signs (%NW15@34 and YP%N) while the coeffi-
cients of others become significant (SGF%NR, NR,
and RU16@19). This result does lend weight to
the criticism that Ehrlich's finding of a deterrent
effect of executions is nothing more than a statis-
tical artifact arising from the use of logarithms.
Three more specifications are tested at the re-
gional level, decreasing the number of variables
and thereby decreasing the multicollinearity which
may have existed in the above equations. Basically,
these equations contain the same variables used in
Ehrlich's time series analysis. The deterrence vari-
ables are the same as in Table B-I except PEI is
used throughout. The remaining explanatory var-
iables include the labor force participation rate,
the unemployment rate, per capita personal in-
come, and the per cent of the population between
ages fifteen and twenty-four. Equation four is es-
timated using modified first differences, equation
five borrows the specification of four but uses levels,
and equation six is merely equation five expressed
in natural logarithms.
Even based on Ehrlich's original specification,
no evidence of deterrence results from these esti-
mations (see Table B-2). There are many different
explanations for this, including the fact that exe-
cutions may not be a deterrent at all with respect
to homicides. The equations in Table B-2 use five
national variables but only two regional variables
to explain regional homicide rates. In this regard,
using national trends to explain regional variances
may cause the overall effect of the explanatory
variable to be negated or entirely deleted. The
TABLE B-2
REGIONAL BASIS: MURDER RATE REGRESSED AGAINST SELECTED VARIABLES (LEVELS, 1950-1960 FIRsT DIFFERENCES,
1951-1960)'
Variable E.C. S.E. E.C. S.E. E.C. S.E.s
Constant 0.455 0.281 750.979 446.700 80.749 81.790
PA4  -0.083 0.358 -0.023 0.030 -0.004 0.005
PGOC@US -0.111 0.212 14.282 24.740 2.596 1.847
PEI 0.146 0.075 3.106 29.180 0.263 0.545
LC%NR 2.292 2.125 431.070 188.400 -1.557 0.662
RU -0.129 0.072 -0.607 0.761 -38.476 12.666
YP%N4  -1.074 0.680 1.940 0.988 -0.015 0.012
N15@24 -0.023 0.016 -1.581 1.146 -5.002 3.681
1 corrected for first-order autocorrelation
2 estimated in first-differences
3 estimated in logarithms
4 regional variables
5 The t-statistic is merely the estimated coefficient divided by the standard error.
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problem of omitted variables is also significant.
The homicides which have the greatest potential
for deterrence are murders for hire or those which
are premeditated and deliberated. There is no
variable to account for those homicides which are
spontaneous, provoked, or based on passion.
This regional analysis is based on the additional
information obtained from combining cross-sec-
tional and time-series analyses and introducing
regional variables. Thus, despite the above prob-
lems, this disaggregated approach nevertheless does
provide new research findings concerning the ex-
istence of a deterrent effect. However, given the
subperiod selected, the variables tested, and the
regional focus, the hypothesis that capital punish-
ment does deter homicides cannot be accepted on
the basis of the regression evidence presented in
this part of the study. There is one further level of
disaggregation that can be used as a basis for
testing this hypothesis. A regression analysis based
on state data provides even more bits of informa-
tion than one based on regional data and would
seem to be the most favorable framework of the
possible data levels in which to test the Ehrlich
deterrence hypothesis.
The Deterrence Hypothesis at the State Level
By examining the data for forty-five states over
a ten-year period, it is possible to increase the
number of observations in the estimation to 495 as
compared to 99 on the regional level. These addi-
tional pieces of information should provide addi-
tional reliable evidence as to the existence or non-
existence of a deterrent effect.
In structuring the equations to be estimated at
the state level, no attempt is made to reestimate
Ehrlich's equation using state data. Instead, a hy-
pothesis is formulated and then tested, and the
results are presented as estimated. In most of the
equations, there are statistically insignificant vari-
ables which do not appear in other studies. The
reason for the presence of such variables may be
due to misspecification of the equation itself, or it
could be a result of the absence of "data mining."
In other words, these equations are not estimated
on a trial-and-error basis. There are underlying
reasofis for the inclusion of each variable, and
justifications for what the magnitude and sign of
each estimated coefficient is expected to be. Un-
doubtedly, a better fit could have been obtained
by dropping the insignificant variables in a succes-
sion of equations until finally arriving at the "best"
fit in terms of t-statistics and other descriptive
measures. However, this process, often done but
seldom admitted, may theoretically bias the results,
since a hypothesized relevant variable is deleted
from the equation and a new estimation performed
with fewer variables. This produces the problem of
omitting variables which were originally hypothe-
sized as theoretically justifiable and relevant.
Table C-1 presents the results of the primary
equation estimated on a state level. The dependent
variable again is the rate of homicides per 100,000
persons in a given state.The three usual deterrence
variables are included in the equation, although
each reflects national, not state, trends. The sign of
each is expected to be negative. Six additional
explanatory variables are in the final specification,
three of which represent state-specific economic,
social, and demographic factors. The three national
variables are the per cent of non-whites between
the ages of 15-24 and 25-34 and the unemployment
rate. The race variables are hypothesized to be
positively related to homicides as is the unemploy-
ment rate. The three state variables include gov-
ernment expenditures per capita (expected to have
a negative correlation), resident population (pos-
tulated to have a positive influence on homicides),
and per capita income (expected to have a negative
influence).
Two of the three deterrence variables are not
only insignificant but also have the wrong sign (see
Table C-I). Only the probability of being appre-
hended reflects any deterrent impact at all. This
result is in accord with other studies mentioned
above which found no deterrent effect in execution,
TABLE C-I










SGF%NR 2  -4.610 7.446
NR 2  0.057 0.154
RU -0.511 0.384
YP%N2  0.064 1.407
I corrected for first-order autocorrelation
2 state-specific variables
3 each state equation has its own individual intercept
(constant term)
' The t-statistic is merely the estimated coefficient
divided by the standard error.
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but which did conclude that the subjective proba-
bility of being caught and convicted may play a
powerful role in deterring criminal behavior. The
signs of some of the other variables are also differ-
ent from what was predicted. However, the stan-
dard errors of the estimated coefficients are so large
that no confidence can be placed in these signs or
in the magnitudes of the coefficients.
Table C-2 displays the results of a second speci-
fication containing a different measure of the death
penalty variable (the per cent of total executions
occurring in each state), only one racial variable
combining the age distribution (NW15@34) but
now on a percentage change basis, and two un-
employment rates also based on age (RU16@19,
RU20@24). The major difference, however, is that
the conviction rate is dropped from the equation
in order to isolate and estimate better the impact
of the two remaining deterrence variables. The
estimation results are not significantly different
from the regression in Table C-1. The apprehen-
sion rate is again negative and significant while the
execution rate is not statistically different from
zero.
The final hypothesis tested focuses on those states
which retained the death penalty during the 1950's.
The five abolitionist states deleted from the equa-
tion are Maine, Rhode Island, Minnesota, Wiscon-
sin, and Michigan. The hypothesis tested is that
one reason the retentionist states have retained the
death penalty as a form of punishment may be
because it achieves the socially desirable goal of
TABLE C-2




Constant3  -280.004 137.200
PA@US - 1.252 0.429
E%US@ 2  -0.037 3.175
%NW15@34 -327.575 391.200
SGF%NR@ 2  -5.494 7.379
RUI6@19 -0.028 0.327
RU20@24 -0.218 0.379
NR@2  0.062 0.155
YP%N@ 2  0.077 1.405
' corrected for first-order autocorrelation
2 state-specific variables
3 each state equation has an individual intercept (con-
stant term) not shown
4The t-statistic is merely the estimated coefficient
divided by the standard error.
TABLE C-3




Constant3  -315.236 156.100
PA@US -1.192 0.474
EUS@2  -0.280 3.206
%NW15@34 -490.105 426.300
SGF%NR@2  -7.136 7.882
RU16@19 0.044 0.362
RU20@24 -0.291 0.420
NR@2  0.052 0.166
YP%N@ 2  0.560 1.479
corrected for first-order serial correlation
2 state-specific variables
3 each state equation has an individual intercept (con-
stant term) (not shown)
4 The t-statistic is merely the estimated coefficient
divided by the standard error.
deterrence. The specification estimated is the same
as in Table C-2, and the results are presented in
Table C-3. There appears to be no significant
difference between all of the states and just the
retentionist states with respect to deterrence. Ap-
prehension again provides the only evidence of
deterrence, while the execution variable remains
insignificant.
In summary, these state equations offer no evi-
dence that the deterrence hypothesis with respect
to executions should be accepted. This finding is
surprising in that the methodology employed in
this study would seemingly favor Ehrlich's hypoth-
esis for two reasons: first, much more information
is available through the use of a temporal cross-
sectional analysis and the reliance on state and
regional data to isolate and clarify further the
relationship between the death penalty and homi-
cides, and second, the interval chosen is favorable
in that executions were still an acceptable and
widely used form of punishment.
The estimated equations do not, however, con-
tain strictly state-specific data. To estimate state
variables more efficiently and accurately, state data
on the apprehension, conviction, and execution
rates and on the economic/social/demographic
factors are essential. Until such data are available,
the true relationships between variables may tend
to be obscured by this mix of state and national
variables. The inclusion of a global or national
variable in an equation with a state-based depen-
dent variable implicitly assumes that the effect of
the national variable will be uniform across all
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states; this may not be true with respect to the
deterrence variables tested here.
ANALYTICAL AND POLICY CONCLUSIONS
The analysis undertaken above seems to lead to
the conclusion that the "efficacy of capital punish-
ment ... to deter others from crime remains a
matter about which reasonable men and reasona-
ble legislators may easily differ." '' Statistical stud-
ies and tests have not been satisfactorily conclusive
either way. "The deterrent effect of capital punish-
ment is definitely not a settled matter, and this is
the strongest social scientific conclusion that can
be reached at the present time."9' The hypotheses
tested in this study are intentionally designed and
specified in such a way that if capital punishment
is a deterrent, this data should prove it. In none of
the equations, however, could the death penalty be
regarded as an effective deterrent. Only the prob-
ability of apprehension could be found significant
and even then only on the state level.
Indeed, the proper question might be not
whether executions do or do not deter homicides,
but rather, given the available data and the prob-
lems involved in estimation, whether the use of
statistical techniques can settle the issue or perhaps
even whether they should be allowed to do so.'
Even though there is no clear statistical evidence
to resolve the debate conclusively, such evidence
has been used, often inappropriately, as a basis for
a judgment most likely already formed. Justice
Marshall, concurring in Furman, interprets such
inconclusive evidence to favor the abolitionists by
deciding that "[d]espite the fact that abolitionists
have not proved non-deterrence beyond a reason-
94 Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 355 (1976)
(White, J., dissenting).
9 Klein, Forst & Filatov, supra note 22, at 359.
96 However, it is not at all clear that the courts will
rely on or even use this evidence in testing the constitu-
tionality of a death penalty statute. justice White, dis-
senting in Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976),
observed:
It will not do to denigrate these legislativejudgments
as some form of vestigial savagery or as purely
retributive in motivation; for they are solemn judg-
ments, reasonably based, that imposition of the
death penalty will save the lives of innocent persons.
This concern for life and human values and the
sincere efforts of the States to preserve them are
matters of the greatest moment with which the
judiciary should be most reluctant to interfere.
Id. at 355 (White, J., dissenting).
Justice Stewart expressed a similar view in his concur-
ring opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 234-35
(1976) (Stewart, J., concurring).
able doubt, they have succeeded in showing by
clear and convincing evidence that capital punish-
ment is not necessary as a deterrent to crime in our
own society. This is all they must do.,
97
All that is really clear is that studies such as this
one have failed to find evidence sufficient to prove
the deterrence hypothesis. This is, of course, quite
different from proving that executions have no
deterrent effect. In testing the hypothesis and re-
jecting it, all that can be said is that the deterrence
theory cannot be accepted, not that the converse is
true. No evidence of deterrence could be found in
this research but the results are not conclusive
either way. This is not to say, however, that such
evidence is unobtainable, although one observer
has commented that, in light of the shortcomings
inherent in these deterrence studies, it may be
doubtful "that the presence or absence of a deter-
rent effect of the death penalty is likely to be
demonstrable by statistical means. '
This conclusion does not seem to be a very
satisfactory way in which to end an inquiry. What
is at stake in these attempts at resolving this issue
are human lives, and a rational and morally ac-
ceptable policy requires, even demands, additional
evidence and information (statistical or otherwise)
upon which a proper evaluation of the deterrence
impact of the death penalty may be made. The
only rationale left to support capital punishment
is deterrence, and so far the only evidence favoring
this rationale is the work of Ehrlich. It does not
seem reasonable to weigh lives against such ques-
tionable statistics and find in favor of the numbers.
In considering the evidence, a policy judgment
may well depend on who has the burden of proof,
the abolitionists or retentionists. Given the context
of permanent and irreversible punishments, the
answer is clear. Not only has the theory of deter-
rence been subject to intense criticism, but also the
use of capital punishment has been critically ques-
tioned as to its desirability in a society espousing
the goal of rehabilitation and not retribution. The
retentionists have the obligation, both morally and
politically, to find conclusive evidence that the
execution of a convicted murderer will deter others
from committing the same crime. Although it has
been suggested that such statistical evidence is just
not possible to find, this does not in any way
change the situation. Until it is conclusively shown
that there is a compelling and justifiable state
interest in overriding the fundamental goal of pre-
9 408 U.S. at 353 (Marshall, J., concurring).
98 Van den Haag, supra note 5, at I.
1979]
serving human life, the death penalty is, from a
policy standpoint, an unacceptable means of pun-
ishment.
The only policy judgment that can be made
based on this analysis is that the probability of
apprehension is the only deterrence variable which
has any effect at all. This finding reinforces in some
ways the conclusion of one study which argued
that
the appropriate criminal justice policy is one which
attempts t6 reduce crime by increasing the proba-
bility of apprehension and prosecution. This would
have the advantage of not only increasing the level
of general deterrence, but might also result in an
increased sense of the fairness of punishment and
lower rates of recidivism.
9
99 Antunes & Hunt, The Impact and Certainty and Severity
of Punishment on Levels of Crime in American States: An
Extended Analysis, 64 J. CRIM. L. & C. 486, 493 (1973)
(footnotes omitted).
If the certainty of apprehension for committing
a crime like murder, which carries with it a severe
sentence rises, then the findings suggest that hom-
icides will fall. In light of this analysis, increased
attention, research, and expenditures in this area
of crime prevention should be chosen over execu-
tions justified only by a questionable deterrence
theory.
The purpose of this comment has been to eval-
uate and critique the existing evidence of the de-
terrent effects of the death penalty and attempt to
add additional information by utilizing a different
approach to the issue. If anything can be concluded
from the foregoing, it is that the deterrence hy-
pothesis may have no real basis in fact. Therefore,
attempts to justify the use of capital punishment
by relying on this theory must be carefully exam-
ined and evaluated, since the consequences of ac-
cepting such a justification as legitiiaate is literally
a matter of life or death.
STEPHEN J. KNORR
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